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ABSTRACT This article analyses policy trends in Indonesian irrigation, particularly during the last ﬁve
decades, from the perspective of dominant narratives, as authored, suggested and pushed by international
donors. It argues that international donors’ adherence to ‘deferred maintenance’ as the core element of
irrigation policy problem framing does not match with farmers’ and the irrigation agency staﬀ perceptions and
practices. The logic of obscuration and the discursive manoeuvers that maintain it are analysed. The article
concludes that there is space for more profound conceptual contestation and for alternative actions pathways
even within the ‘dominant paradigm’ to address management problems more eﬀectively.
I. Introduction
International donors have played a signiﬁcant role in deﬁning policy problems in irrigation
development in developing countries through the creation and sustenance of dominant narratives
(Roe, 1994). From the late 1960s they have authored, suggested and pushed narratives upon
which national irrigation policies of developing countries should be based. Taking Indonesia as
our main case, we analyse, from a social constructionist perspective (Stone, 1989), donors’ pre-
eminent role in problem framing in and for irrigation policy. We investigate the framing of the
‘irrigation question’ by international policy elites, in interaction with national policy elites,1 by
looking at how policy ideas are created and sustained through narratives based on common
sense, causal reasoning, and their political eﬀects.
Hegemonic tendencies in policy formulation processes, including the way policy elites translate
a ‘diﬃcult situation’ into a ‘policy problem’, have been widely discussed in policy science
literature (Edelman, 1988; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). As stated by Edelman (1988: 12),
‘[p]roblems come into existence, not simply because they are there or because they are important
for well being. They constitute people as subjects with particular kinds of aspirations, self-
concepts and fears, and they create beliefs about the relative importance of events and objects.
Most importantly, they are critical in determining who exercise authority and who accept it’.
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Problem analysis in policy science has focused on four major themes: (i) the logical sequence in
problem deﬁnition (what produced the problem? where did it come from?) (Dye, 1984); (ii) the
characteristics of policy actors that deﬁne the problem (Gusﬁeld, 1981); (iii) the use of language
and symbols in shaping a problem’s portrayal (Apthorpe, 1986; Edelman, 1988); and (iv) how
problem deﬁnition is linked to the way policy-makers perceive available solutions (Wildavsky,
1979). In international development cooperation problem analysis tends to be (i) highly
standardised, that is, internationally generated problem analysis is thought to apply to a broad
range of situations, if not universally (Molle, 2008) and (ii) preoccupied by the desire to generate
the ‘right policy model’, problem analysis tends to be strongly prescriptive (Mosse, 2004; Rap,
2006).
International donors’ promotion of widespread adoption of international policy trends by
developing country governments is a structural characteristic of development cooperation. Bauer
(1972) and Easterly (2003) argue that these hegemonic tendencies are rooted in the mis-
conceptualisation of unsatisfactory progress in development as a shortage of capital, to be
remedied by donor loans and projects. Crewe and Harrison (1998) show how international
development assistance is often made available based primarily on donors’ perceptions,
regardless of coincidence with national and grass roots development conditions, demands,
interests and aspirations (also see Mosse et al., 1998).
In the last ﬁve decades Indonesia has undergone dramatic political changes: from Suharto’s
development-focused but repressive New Order (Jackson and Pye, 1980; Vatikiotis, 1998) to the
upsurge of reform forces that led to today’s imperfect but relatively vigorous democracy (Aspinall
and Fealy, 2003; Schulte-Nordholt, 2003). Notwithstanding this political and organisational
turmoil, the irrigation bureaucracy was able to preserve its sectoral prominence, identity and
centralised power. This singularity of the trajectory of Indonesian government irrigation suggests
several things. While the Suharto era might be read as a ‘global dominance’ example, the more
recent events show the strength of the ‘domestic’ agency of the Indonesian irrigation bureaucracy
independent of external inﬂuence. Together, this suggests an alignment of international and
national policy elites around a modernisation project and institutional reproduction interests.
We do not attempt in this article to present a general political economy and development
theory analysis of this conﬁguration and its history. We focus on one dimension, the role of
policy narratives in the reproduction of it, or alternatively formulated, its role in explaining the
singularity of the Indonesian government irrigation trajectory. We do not claim that policy
narratives are the ‘key’, ‘basic’, ‘fundamental’ or otherwise primary element of the structure that
we describe. We do think it is of considerable causal signiﬁcance, while it has not received much
research attention in the irrigation domain, but it is no doubt only one of several determinations.
Our main point at this level of analysis is, however, a diﬀerent one. The reproduction or
transformation of the structure of which policy narratives are an element does not happen
automatically, it has to be performed. In this performance there is often contestation –
conceptual (cognitive) contestation, and contested decisions and choices for action pathways. We
are interested to understand how donor shaped policy narratives, and the simpliﬁcations and
discursive manoeuvers that are a part of them, have helped the reproduction of Indonesia’s
‘technical irrigation’ (reform) policy trajectory over a period of ﬁve decades.
Towards the end of the article we discuss whether the stability of the policy narrative of
Indonesian irrigation development could possibly allow alternative approaches to reform that
are more useful to irrigators. This is a pertinent question as Indonesia’s post-independence
irrigation policy has failed to eﬀectively address management problems in government irrigation
systems, problems that translate into unsatisfactory productivity levels and distributional
injustices. We observe a mismatch between, on one side, the dominant narrative underpinning
Indonesia’s irrigation policy, and on the other side, the actual perceptions and irrigation system
management practices of farmers and the Indonesian irrigation agency staﬀ. We will suggest that
there is space for both more profound conceptual contestation and for alternative actions
pathways even within the ‘dominant paradigm’.
























As such, this article is part of a broader attempt to understand and dislodge the unusual
defensiveness of the irrigation, and more generally the large scale water infrastructure,
government sector as regards incorporating into business-as-usual ecology, poverty alleviation
and inclusive democracy perspectives – and, for that matter, new public management approaches
to running a bureaucracy (cf. Mollinga and Bolding, 2004).2 Theoretically, the broader concern
is that structural and interest based explanations seem to be insuﬃciently equipped to capture
this tenacity, while practically and politically the concern is that more precise investigation of the
reproduction mechanisms may yield new entry points for enhancing reform. The article explores
and illustrates these concerns through a case study of Indonesian irrigation reform.
II. International Donors and Dominant Policy Narratives in Indonesian Irrigation
For the colonial Indian context Stone (1984: 8) states that ‘[i]n its design, modes of operation,
and intended eﬀects, canal irrigation was ultimately a cultural expression, representing the
priorities and aspirations of its western architects’. Indonesian concepts of ‘modern’ canal
irrigation expressed the interests of Dutch colonialism, and some of the contradictions of that
rule, notably the way canal irrigation for (colonial) irrigated sugarcane production had to be
combined with (local) irrigated food crop production (Hofstede and Santbrink, 1979). The
concept of ‘technical irrigation’ in Indonesia, as expressed for instance in Indonesian irrigation
engineering textbooks (DGWRD, 1986) and stemming from the colonial period (Eijsvogel,
1949), embodies irrigation engineers’ idealised perception of physical irrigation infrastructure as
an instrument of (economic and agricultural) development. In the ‘technical irrigation’
perspective, an irrigation system can be managed only when it is equipped with appropriately
(that is, by scientiﬁcally trained engineers) designed canal infrastructure, built for a (nationally)
deﬁned purpose. The ‘cultural expression’ of rule that government irrigation construction and
management embodies is obscured in this scientiﬁcally framed instrumentalism of state led
development.3
After independence state built/managed irrigation remained an important technology of rule
(Lansing, 1991). The independent Indonesian government set out on a ‘planned development’
approach with irrigation development as a core feature. The global attempts of the 1970s to
promote agricultural intensiﬁcation programmes reinforced this and stimulated rapid technical
development in the irrigation sector. Rooted in concerns about rapid population growth and
fears of a ‘red revolution’ in developing countries (Anderson et al., 1982), the ‘productive
discourse’ (Booth, 1988) marked the beginning of the ‘green revolution’ era, with, in Asia, the
introduction of high yielding varieties of rice.4
In this post-independence context of planned development and agricultural intensiﬁcation the
colonial concept of ‘technical irrigation’ development was revamped to ﬁt new conditions. The
policy narrative that emerged was a variant of what Allan (2006) has labelled the ‘hydraulic
mission’ perspective. It involved a focus on infrastructure development and water supply
enhancement for achieving the objectives of national economic development as deﬁned by the
state, and supported by international donors discursively and ﬁnancially.
International donors’ strong inﬂuence in shaping Indonesia’s irrigation development originates
in this era. In the late 1960s the World Bank started with the PROSIDA (Irrigation Project from
International Development Agency) as Indonesia’s ﬁrst foreign funded irrigation infrastructure
development project (NEDECO, 1978). With ongoing support from the Bank, PROSIDA
continued until 1989 and became the country’s largest and most prolonged project undertaking in
irrigation infrastructure development. Investment in irrigation infrastructure grew dramatically
through the ﬁrst three Repelitas (Indonesia’s ﬁve years development plans from 1969 to 1983)
supported by a series of foreign loans packages (Pasandaran and Rosegrant, 1995).
Indonesia’s post-independence irrigation policy trajectory has diﬀerent phases, mainly deﬁned
by shifts in international approaches to irrigation, leading to a succession of national policy
approaches. However, Indonesian irrigation policy exhibits considerable consistency over time as
























regards its ‘hydraulic mission’ characteristics. The infrastructure orientation established in the
ﬁrst decades after independence has been maintained across the subsequent internationally
induced and enforced policy shifts, and has not been undermined by the lack of improvement in
irrigation system performance achieved by the irrigation policies in each of the phases of the
trajectory.
Operation and Maintenance
In the 1980s, the global policy emphasis in irrigation development shifted from a focus on
infrastructure construction towards systems operation and maintenance (O&M). This shift
coincided with a decline in the international prices of major irrigated crops and an increase in
construction costs (Turral, 1995). In the O&M approach, international donors deﬁned ‘deferred
maintenance’ as the core problem in government managed irrigation systems worldwide.
Observing rapid deterioration of irrigation system infrastructure, donors considered that
government irrigation systems performed poorly because of this (World Bank, 1986): DM
(deferred maintenance) ! PP (poor performance).5 Inversing this assumed causality, irrigation
development was focused on attempts to preserve the condition of the physical infrastructure:
O&M !DM!PP. Indonesia’s irrigation agency formulated detailed O&M guidelines for
systems management as part of the new loan conditions (Ministry of Public Works, 1994a,
1994b). This guideline consisted of a list of O&M activities that should be conducted by the
irrigation agency staﬀ in the regional oﬃces. A separate O&M budget was disbursed directly to
the provincial irrigation agency as part of project funds.
Despite the formulation of O&M guidelines, maintenance continued to be deferred in practice
(Pasandaran, 1991). At the provincial level, the dedicated O&M budget was hardly used for
systems O&M, but for other purposes (Suhardiman, 2008). Nevertheless, the infrastructure focus
of O&M policy was not questioned in donors’ irrigation policy discourse.6
Water User Associations
Induced by the emerging importance of community based development studies and approaches
(Esman and Uphoﬀ, 1984; Ostrom, 1990), the organisational approach became a new
international trend in irrigation development. The inclusion of a community based development
perspective in the policy agenda of the international donors was triggered by mounting criticisms
from anthropological and sociological studies in rural development (for irrigation, summarised
in Eggink and Ubels, 1984). ‘Top down’ development projects were criticised, and observed to be
linked with a deterioration of common property resources and impoverishment of the rural
community. Suggesting a ‘bottom up’ approach as an alternative, the inclusion of farmers in the
formulation and implementation of government development policies was advocated (Cham-
bers, 1988).
Unlike previous approaches, the organisational approach (Bottrall, 1981) emphasises the
important role played by farmers in shaping irrigation systems’ management, their capabilities,
and potential role in improving the overall performance of government managed irrigation
systems. Farmer participation was encouraged through the formation of water user associations
(WUAs) (Lowdermilk, 1986). In Indonesia, the importance of WUA formation was underscored
by presidential instruction number 2 of 1984 on WUAs. WUA formation became a new
development target in Indonesia’s donor funded irrigation projects. The assumed causality for
performance improvement was: WUA!O&M!DM!PP.
In practice, WUA formation did not result in improved systems O&M (cf. Schrevel, 1993;
Duewel, 1995). This fact, however, did not lead to a reconsideration of the basic premises of the
‘deferred maintenance’ focused approach. On the contrary, systems maintenance continued to be
funded through donor loans as evidenced during the ﬁrst and second Irrigation Sub-Sector
Project (ISSP I and II) from 1987 to 1995.

























In the 1990s, the incorporation of the farmer participation concept into the more broadly
conceived irrigation management transfer (IMT) policy marked the shift from an organisational
to an institutional approach. IMT policy promotes the transfer of management roles and
responsibility in irrigation systems management from the irrigation agency to farmer
organisations (WUAs). Referring to the successful implementation of management transfer in
Mexico (World Bank, 2001), international policy-makers hailed the Mexico model as the reform
model for irrigation development (Johnson III et al., 2004; Rap, 2006). Later, the World Bank
adopted IMT as one of the cornerstones of its water management policy (Groenfeldt and
Svendsen, 2000), and it became a reform model promoted worldwide.
The institutional approach linked farmer participation with ﬁnancial autonomy (Svendsen,
1993) aiming at greater farmer decision-making authority in overall systems management.
The shift in policy discourse from farmer participation to management transfer was impelled
by the neoliberal development discourse (Carney and Farrington, 1998). In the irrigation
sector, this translated into a strong belief in the force of economic incentives in systems
management (Small and Carruthers, 1991; Dinar and Subramanian, 1997). Viewing water as
an economic good, neoliberal discourse emphasises the need to shift ﬁnancial responsibility
for government irrigation systems from the irrigation agency to farmers as the direct
beneﬁciaries.
The most basic logic of IMT went as follows: WUA!CR(cost recovery)!
O&M!DM!PP, but this logic knows several permutations. There was intense debate,
in Indonesia as elsewhere, on the question whether irrigation system rehabilitation (ISR) should
precede WUA formation plus cost recovery or the reverse (Bruns and Atmanto, 1992). The
controversy can be represented as ISRþWUA!CR!O&M!DM!PP vs. [WUA!
CR!O!M]þISR!DM!PP. The debate on the sequencing of cost recovery by WUAs
and O&M/ISR has remained inconclusive; ‘mutual reinforcement’ being a position that
encapsulates both while leaving causality in the middle, as stated in the Operations Evaluation
Department (OED) report of the World Bank: ‘to achieve the full advantage from a system of
cost recovery for O&M it is necessary that the revenues recovered [be] directed toward O&M
costs’ (Jones, 1995: 38).
In Indonesia, IMT policy was initially formulated and implemented in the late 1980s, and was
renewed in 1999, both under World Bank funded projects. Prior to 1999, the scope of IMT policy
was limited to irrigation systems under the so called IMT pilot projects and the degree of transfer
limited to the secondary level7 of the irrigation systems. In 1999 the scope of management
transfer was broadened to all irrigation systems, and its degree extended up to the full system
level (Letter of Sector Policy, 1999).8
In practice, IMT policy implementation prior and after 1999 resulted neither in improved
system performance nor in better cost recovery, partly due to the irrigation agency’s resistance
towards the idea of management transfer. Findings from studies conducted by the International
Water Management Institute and Gadjah Mada University indicate that mixed results with
regard to WUAs’ role in water distribution in particular, and in irrigation management in
general, show that there was no direct link between WUA formation and system performance
(Vermillion et al., 2000). The conventional pattern of farmers deferring major maintenance costs
until the government might return with external assistance for infrastructure rehabilitation was
not overcome by turnover (Murtiningrum, 2002; Bruns, 2003).
In summary, the diﬀerent phases of post-independence Indonesian irrigation policy focused on
diﬀerent mechanisms for irrigation system performance enhancement, reﬂecting international
policy trends. In all irrigation policy incarnations a canal infrastructure in good technical shape
was considered the key to success; diﬀerences in the policies were diﬀerences in the approach to
achieve that good shape. The infrastructure emphasis was maintained discursively as well as
practically across the post-independence period.
























III. Simpliﬁcations in the Dominant Narratives
From the later stage of the technical approach until the formulation of IMT policy in Indonesia,
international donors, national/international policy-makers collectively and consensually agreed9
that the problem of poor systems performance was rooted in rapid deterioration of the irrigation
infrastructure – labelled as ‘deferred maintenance’. New policy strategies (WUA formation and
IMT) were deﬁned in both the organisational and institutional approaches, and the subject of
intense debate. For instance, the role of the irrigation agency was recommended to evolve from
development agent in the technical approach to become more of a farmer’s partner in the
institutional approach (Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999). Similarly, the role of farmers was
projected from development recipient to become more of a development agent. These strategies,
however, remained ensnared in the infrastructure-oriented problem deﬁnition and development
paradigm.10 The issue of ‘purpose’11 continued to be explained from the donors’ point of view as
the absolute need to maintain a good condition of the physical infrastructure. As stated in the
Letter of Sector Policy (1999): ‘A deferred maintenance culture together with periodic externally
aided rehabilitation has resulted in a costly short-lived irrigation system’.
Simpliﬁcation 1: Translating Correlations into Causalities
International donors, and others, correctly observe the joint occurrence of poor performance
(PP) of Indonesian irrigation systems and deferred maintenance. International donors posit a
causal connection between the two in their problem framings: DM ! PP. We question this
framing by ﬁrst showing that the assumed causality DM! PP is not how irrigators and system
managers perceive the role of and practically use irrigation infrastructure in day to day water
management. We then explain how deferred maintenance institutionally functions as a desirable
rather than a problem.
During in-depth ﬁeld work in 2004 we found that farmers do not have any particular interest
in the infrastructure’s condition, apart from its role as a tool to convey irrigation water to their
ﬁelds. Farmers hardly ever complained about the poor condition of their irrigation infrastructure
if their water needs were met (Suhardiman, 2008). Farmers do not neglect system maintenance
for the purpose of deteriorating the irrigation infrastructure, nor do they make complicated
trade-oﬀ calculations between their own short-term inputs into maintenance and the likelihood
of external (longer-term) repairs in response to deterioration. Regular maintenance of the
irrigation infrastructure does not signiﬁcantly increase the actual water ﬂow in the canal, despite
the link between maintenance and irrigation systems eﬃciency posited in irrigation science
(Carruthers and Morrison, 1994; Skutsch and Evans, 1999). In practice, farmers solve water
scarcity problems either by approaching the irrigation agency staﬀ for additional water, or by
arranging additional supply illegally – not through regular maintenance.
Similarly, irrigation agency staﬀ did not consider regular infrastructure maintenance as
instrumental for system performance improvement, but rather evaluated the need for such
maintenance against the usefulness of a deteriorating system for mobilising rehabilitation funds.
This logic became apparent during ﬁeldwork when the irrigation agency staﬀ took important
visitors (mostly project oﬃcials from provincial or national irrigation department) to the sites of
the deteriorated infrastructure to justify the need for rehabilitation. Neither farmers nor system
managers’ behaviour is thus strongly shaped by the assumed DM ! PP causality. Maintenance
and rehabilitation of infrastructure apparently play a diﬀerent role and are part of broader and
more complex considerations than getting the irrigation system to function as per design.
In Indonesia, deferred maintenance institutionally functioned more as a desirable than as a
problem. Deferred maintenance is perpetuated by central and regional governments’ interests in
using their allocated sector development budget. Formally, before the fall of Suharto in 1998, the
provincial government was responsible for system O&Mwhile the national irrigation department
remained in charge of construction and rehabilitation (IOMP, 1987: background point 4). In
























practice, the provincial government neglected systems O&M and used the O&M funds primarily
to increase government staﬀ salaries. The national irrigation department tolerated the provincial
government’s negligence as this served its interest to ensure access to infrastructure rehabilitation
funds from both the state treasury and international donors. Through this access, it continued to
rehabilitate irrigation infrastructure on regular basis almost regardless of the actual condition of
the infrastructure. In general, a government agency has the tendency to annually spend all the
allocated funds as unused funds will have to be returned to the national treasury, while such
returns can result in a decreased budget allocation for the next year (Suhardiman, 2008).
Following a self-reinforcing logic (Vermillion et al., 2000), the provincial government’s
negligence of O&M is rooted in the fact that they can rely on regular if not repetitive premature
rehabilitation conducted by the national irrigation department. Deferred maintenance thus
serves to keep the budget cycle going, and assists institutional reproduction at diﬀerent
bureaucratic levels.
Rather than being each other’s cause, we suggest that deferred maintenance and poor
performance are both caused by something else: X ! DMþPP and are a symptom of more
chronic problems in the sector. Translating the DM/PP correlation into a causality eﬀectively
obscures the X factor. The political logic of this is discussed below after having identiﬁed two
more simpliﬁcations in irrigation problem framing.
Simpliﬁcation 2: The FMIS-WUA Analogy
International donors designed the organisational characteristics of WUAs taking local farmer
organisation in community governed and managed irrigation systems (so called FMIS) as an
example. Assuming that the concept of farmer organisation under FMIS can be replicated in
government managed irrigation systems, the idea was to establish government induced farmer
organisations whose role was to solve the problem of poor system performance (Coward, 1980).
As Hunt (1989: 79) jested: ‘The analogy is indeed attractive, if the farmers would only
participate, the thinking goes, then the ditches would be constructed, the water would be
allocated, and most important of all, the maintenance would be done’. The translation of a
farmer participation concept as found in FMIS into government managed irrigation systems is
problematic, but it was not questioned in the dominant policy narratives.12
Studies on WUAs show that the organisational properties possessed by irrigation
communities cannot be transferred to government managed systems simply through the
formation of WUAs (Freeman and Lowdermilk, 1985; Bromley and Cernea, 1989). A distinct
organisational characteristic of WUAs as compared with farmer organisations in FMIS is that
in FMIS farmers control the water source (self-governance), as well as arrange overall water
distribution (self-management) (Hunt, 1989). A WUA’s authority in government managed
irrigation systems is limited to the lower levels in a system’s hierarchy (the tertiary and
sometimes secondary level). In Indonesia, WUAs’ role in water distribution practices was
undermined by their lack of authority to ensure farmers’ water supply as the irrigation agency
ﬁeld staﬀ remained in charge for the operation of major infrastructure (Schrevel, 1993;
Duewel, 1995; Suhardiman, 2008). Moreover, no institutional framework exists within which
to negotiate allocation and distribution; the irrigation agency being legally the single
responsible actor ‘above the outlet’. Our ﬁeld research shows that WUA staﬀ hardly touched
the irrigation outlet devices unless they encountered urgent water scarcity problems, which
often forced them to damage/break the infrastructure.
This conundrum was documented in the international literature as early as 1980 (Wade and
Chambers, 1980), but was not incorporated into WUA programme thinking. That thinking
maintained the (implicit) assumption, a simpliﬁcation, that poor system performance in
government managed irrigation could be addressed with a ‘local level only’ approach, that is, an
approach that targeted its interventions at the tertiary level, and often suggested that farmers
needed to be ‘educated’ to improve their irrigation practices (cf. Mollinga et al., 2007).13
























The assumption that farmer organisations under FMIS can be replicated in government
managed irrigation systems, and that poor system performance can be thus successfully
addressed through ‘local level’ intervention, is a simpliﬁcation that obscures three key
characteristics of government managed irrigation: (i) the crucial role of the irrigation agency
in providing reliable water supply, and its common failure to do so, (ii) the challenge of
governing multi-users systems, and (iii) the divergent interests, allocation questions and conﬂicts
among irrigators. In short, the simpliﬁcation negates the everyday politics of irrigation
management (Mollinga, 2008).
Simpliﬁcation 3: Farmers-irrigation Agency Relationship
Under the 1990s ‘institutional approach’ of IMT, international donor documents express the
belief that the problem of persistent poor performance in government managed irrigation system
can be solved through the transfer of management responsibility from the irrigation agency to
farmer organisations (WUAs). The dominant policy narrative posits that farmers would have a
higher sense of ownership toward the irrigation infrastructure14 if they are given the
responsibility to manage the irrigation systems. Consequently, it is thought that this increased
sense of ownership could eventually eliminate the problem of deferred maintenance, and thus
solve the problem of persistent poor performance.
With IMT international donors and policy-makers project a new role (such as basin manager
and regulator) for irrigation agencies (Johnson III et al., 2004). Our interviews with irrigation
agency staﬀ at diﬀerent administrative levels showed that the agency was not always convinced
about its new role, and questioned the need for management transfer. International policy-
makers apparently assumed either that the irrigation agency would be willing to change its role in
the sector development or that it could be ordered and forced to make direct changes in its
organisational functioning in accordance with the proposed policy reform, following IMT policy
adoption. The lack of agency conviction was often camouﬂaged by the irrigation agency’s formal
acceptance of the proposed change, as stated in loan agreements between the agency and the
donors.
The key simpliﬁcation in IMT narratives is that new WUAs can be empowered by the very
institution these organisations are thought to replace. That the irrigation agency has identity and
interests of its own, and cannot be treated as being merely an administrative implementer of
policy (Quarles van Uﬀord, 1988), is not given suﬃcient consideration. Perhaps not surprisingly,
IMT policy implementation in Indonesia continues to be limited to the secondary level of the
irrigation systems due to the irrigation agency’s resistance to increase the scope and degree of
management transfer (Bruns and Atmanto, 1992).15
IV. The Logic of Obscuration: Political Eﬀects of Portraying ‘Deferred Maintenance’ as Dominant
Cause
Sikkink (1991: 2) states that: ‘The consolidation of developmental ideas often depends on the
degree to which the new model ﬁts with existing ideologies of important economic and social
groups’. This section argues that the logic of donors’ attachment to the misinformed causality
and ungrounded assumptions regarding the centrality of ‘deferred maintenance’ in explanations
of poor performance, and the other simpliﬁcations that were discussed above, is not caused by
oversight, but is rooted in donors’ interest to sustain and reproduce their particular role in
irrigation development in Indonesia. In this sense the article is a case study of ‘paradigm
maintenance’ (Broad, 2006) (also see Foucault, 1991; Molle, 2008).
The presentation of ‘deferred maintenance’ as the causal argument in the dominant narratives
achieves three things. First, it downplays the role of poor construction in the vicious cycle of
poor construction/deferred maintenance/premature rehabilitation that irrigation interventions
seek to break. By downplaying poor construction and emphasising deferred maintenance, donors
























distance themselves from the problem of bureaucratic rent seeking that underlies poor
construction in the irrigation sector. Moreover, instead of problematising the use of development
funds, the emphasis on deferred maintenance provides a logic for providing additional
development funds (Ferguson, 1997). By deﬁning deferred maintenance as the key problem in
government irrigation systems, the donor–country relationship remained stable; funds for system
rehabilitation and maintenance continued to come from donor funded project budgets.16
Second, emphasis on deferred maintenance, together with the other two simpliﬁcations, keeps
international donors on an apparently apolitical development track. The IMT narrative
disconnects IMT from the issue of bureaucratic reform. IMT is a ‘ﬂight forward’ in the sense of
deﬁning new roles for both irrigators and irrigation agency, leaving their present roles
unquestioned other than that their outcome is ‘poor performance’. This goes to the extent that
donors present IMT as a managerial/technical measure to improve systems performance, to be
implemented by the irrigation agency, thus eﬀectively camouﬂaging the political aspect of
changing power balances that is, or rather, logically should be, part of management transfer. In
the approaches preceding IMT policy, the role of the irrigation agency remained even more
unquestioned than in IMT narratives.
Third, the dominant narratives reﬂect a set of ideas that can easily be translated into donor
agencies’ legally prescribed organisational rules and procedures. With the shift from the technical
to the O&M approach, the obligation to include O&M budget as part of the overall project
budget does not complicate the overall project management, as this additional procedure can be
monitored and evaluated using the same standard of measurements and indicators. Similarly, the
formation of WUAs can be incorporated as an additional activity in the overall project
management because WUA’s role remains focused on system maintenance. Finally, monitoring
and evaluation of management transfer activities can be conducted using the same measurement
principle as IMT continued to be implemented within the overall context of infrastructure
development.
The dominant narratives thus represent a shared causal belief (poor systems performance due
to deferred maintenance), notions of validity (visibly deteriorated irrigation infrastructure), and
sets of common practices associated with a set of problems (project management procedures) of
the international donor community in irrigation development (Yee, 1996). In the ‘technical
irrigation’ era deferred maintenance emerged as a solution based problem deﬁnition through
which donors could address their developmental concerns and interests, a justiﬁcation continued
in the organisational approach and IMT policy. The way Indonesian IMT implementation
procedures are rooted in systems maintenance and rehabilitation of irrigation physical
infrastructure (see Vermillion et al., 2000) shows that IMT formulation, notwithstanding its
institutional vocabulary, was driven primarily by donors’ interest for performance enhancement
through improved maintenance, as does the discussion on sequencing of system rehabilitation
and turn over referred to above.17
V. Discussions and Conclusion
This article has analysed how an infrastructure-oriented development paradigm has remained
dominant in a succession of policy narratives that purportedly focus on the ‘institutional
dimensions’ of irrigation reform: WUA and IMT centred approaches. We have particularly
shown how international donors’ problem framing as part of substantial continued ﬁnancial
support has contributed to this persistence. We have discussed the transformation process from
‘diﬃculty’ to ‘policy problem’ for the Indonesian irrigation sector, a sector where national
policies are strongly shaped by international policy trends.
Analysis of the policy transformation process shows the resonance between donors’ interest to
preserve their hegemonic role in the formulation process of international policy trends and the
irrigation agency’s interest to preserve its sectoral privileges in the national sphere. In the context
of development cooperation, the ‘diﬃculty ! problem’ transformation process has limited
























vulnerability to direct contestation and open confrontation as it takes place in a ‘closed’ and
‘delocalised’ forum involving primarily those who have direct interest in consensual
transformation. In Indonesia’s irrigation sector, sector development decisions were negotiated
primarily by international donors and the respective sector ministries with some formal but
limited involvement from other government agencies. The national irrigation agency’s
inclination is to accept donors’ agenda rather than risking the halting of donors’ funding, as
this funding is instrumental to reproduction of the irrigation agency’s prominence in the national
sphere. Similarly, international donors are inclined to promote widespread adoption of
international policy trends by developing countries governments, relying on the national
irrigation agency’s formal compliance to adopt these policies, in order to achieve disbursement
targets (cf. Mosley et al., 1995; Araral, 2005).
This structural ‘lock in’ of the irrigation policy discourse in the resonating interests of
international and national policy elites that we have summarised above does, however, not
capture the full dynamics of the situation. The Indonesian case shows that the poor results of
irrigation management interventions are at least partly rooted in the misrepresentation of the
management problem in government irrigation systems in the dominant narratives of the past
decades. These narratives have meant that certain avenues for addressing management problems
were closed oﬀ, discursively (for instance, analysis of the functioning of the irrigation bureaucracy)
as well as practically (for instance, inclusion of irrigators in irrigation governance). The continuing
inconvenient truth of poor performance thus generates paradoxes and contradictions in irrigation
policy, which have accumulated over time. These are manifest particularly in the IMT approach. By
simultaneously portraying the irrigation agency as a government agent incapable of managing the
irrigation system, and as reform agent responsible for the formulation and implementation of IMT,
the dominant narrative eﬀectively suggests that high performance farmer organisations can be
formed and developed by an unreformed and ineﬃcient irrigation agency.
The discursive manoeuvring that is needed to maintain the policy logic underwriting the
resonance of the international and national policy elite interests is thus not without cracks and
ﬁssures. Performance related evidence can be interpreted variably, causing policy frames conﬂicts
(Rein and Scho¨n, 1993). For instance, the poor condition of the irrigation infrastructure can be
mobilised as evidence by IMT proponents to promote IMT (by assuming that farmers are willing
to take over systems management and more capable in doing it, or that the irrigation agency is
incapable to do its tasks; as often expressed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and
civil society groups in Indonesia), as well as seen as evidence by IMT opponents for halting IMT
(by assuming that farmers are not willing to take over systems management and are responsible
for the deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure in the ﬁrst place; as suggested by the majority
of irrigation agency staﬀ at diﬀerent administrative levels). Similarly, farmers’ lack of technical
knowledge to manage the technically complicated irrigation systems can be mobilised as evidence
for halting IMT by IMT opponents, and at the same time, by IMT proponents, as evidence to
continue with IMT as a means for capacity building.
To deal with such contradicting accounts, which cannot be solved by reference to empirical
evidence as both sides of the argument refer to the same evidence, one ‘game that donors play’
(cf. Araral, 2008) is that of ‘passing the buck’ – to the national policy elites. International donors
labelled the lack of desirable impact of IMT policy and programmes as so called ‘implementation
barriers’ (Apthorpe, 1986). Among these barriers were: the irrigation agency’s lack of motivation
to direct the process of management transfer; the WUAs’ inability to ﬁll in their new role in
systems management; and the lack of coordination between the implementing agencies (Huppert
et al., 2001). Rather than explicating the ‘why’ of these phenomena and design subsequent policy
strategies on the basis of that, these elements are simply ‘inversed’ and presented as preconditions
required to be tackled before IMT policy implementation. Proposed remedial actions included: a
clear task redeﬁnition between government and farmers; good condition of irrigation
infrastructure; and strong support from the government (Frederiksen, 1992). What this mode
of reasoning accomplishes, by design or by default, is that when these preconditions and
























requirements are not met, donors implicitly portray the poor outcomes of IMT as caused by
factors beyond their control as well as beyond their role in IMT. Disguising IMT policy’s
conceptual limitations as implementation barriers, donors displace their responsibility to
(national state) actors at the implementation end, and rely on these so called ‘external factors’ as
escape hatches.18
Structuralist explanations of poor performance of the irrigation sector emphasising the ‘rent
seeking’ character of irrigation bureaucracies (Repetto, 1986), and of the donors–national
government nexus (see Araral, 2008) posit straightforward relations of causality and resonance:
[system of corruption] ! [poor performance] and [growth of loan portfolio]  ! [ensure
bureaucratic survival] respectively. Such explanations are simpliﬁcations because they do not
suﬃciently unpack the arrow: the exact mechanisms and processes through which structure
translates into outcome are not speciﬁed as the analysis of problem framing in irrigation policy
narratives in this article has shown.19 The policy implications are huge: the simpliﬁed reasoning
logically suggests a transparency/accountability focus of ‘good governance’ reform of irrigation
agencies, along the lines of the ‘implementation barriers’ referred to above. It makes
performance enhancement dependent on structural transformation – hence sometimes very
heavy handed (neoliberal) attempts to use donor ﬁnancial leverage for ‘structural adjustment’.
Within the irrigation sector this has produced very limited results in most cases, and in larger
countries with powerful irrigation bureaucracies has been simply politically unfeasible, as in
Indonesia (for case studies see Mollinga and Bolding, 2004). Acknowledgement and under-
standing of the mechanisms and processes that connect structural conditions with outcomes, and
of the non-linearity of these connections, can identify less dramatic but possibly more realistic
and eﬀective reform strategies, while the paradoxes, contradictions and policy frames conﬂicts
may provide the discursive and policy space for advocating them (see Mollinga et al., 2007 for a
general argument).
To conclude our article and argument we report on our ﬁeld research in Kulon Progo district
(Java), to illustrate how such alternative strategies do sometimes ‘self-emerge’ from the realities
of ﬁeld level irrigation management and would lend themselves for support, also by international
development agencies. Our ﬁeld research shows that unlike their national and provincial
colleagues, district irrigation agency staﬀ were concretely involved in farmers’ day to day water
distribution practices. The ﬁeld level staﬀ cannot focus on their interest to pull in infrastructure
development funds without dealing with farmers’ water needs. The research (reported in
Suhardiman, 2008) shows how the irrigation agency staﬀ ensured water supply to farmer’s ﬁelds
and farmers paid for the rendered service. This relationship and interaction explains the
increased production that was achieved (due to irrigated area expansion and increased cropping
intensity)20 and shows that in this case the role of the agency’s ﬁeld level staﬀ was indeed that of a
service provider, though not because of policy instruction, but as emergent from concrete local
conditions and relationships. The role that the technical infrastructure played was also diﬀerent
than that envisaged in policy documents. To achieve wider distribution of water the natural
drainage system was made use of, circumventing complications associated with conveyance
through the canal distribution system. The canal infrastructure was reconﬁgured and remodelled
rather than maintained and rehabilitated (for similar examples of this in the Philippines, see
Oorthuizen, 2003).
Performance enhancement thus does not have to revolve around, or start from, perfection of
the existing technical infrastructure to ensure its optimal operation (Styles and Plusquelleq,
1997), but rather from the shaping of the farmer agency interface (Vincent, 2001) in ways that
speak and respond to concrete ﬁeld level concerns and relationships. Adapting water distribution
patterns, processes and technologies to achieve better water supply to farmer’s ﬁelds is deﬁnitely
such a concern: there is no contradiction with existing policy at this general level. However, the
simpliﬁed and depoliticised accounts and analyses of this concern in international and national
irrigation policy documents and irrigation engineering textbook doctrines21 obscure, evade or
ignore actual dynamics and thereby miss out on entry points for change. Approaches starting
























from such actual dynamics would conceive of ‘WUA formation’ and other institutional
innovation as a contested and negotiated process of organising and empowering at the farmers
agency interface, rather than an act of formal legal and administrative constituting facilitated by
a variety of forms of ‘capacity building’.
Notes
1. These policy elites include politicians, national and international policy-makers, policy advisors, and international
donor agencies. On policy elites as epistemic communities, see Haas (1992) and Yee (1996). We do not suggest that
donors carry sole responsibility for the priorities of Indonesian irrigation policy. We do highlight donors’ prominent
role in providing broader international justiﬁcation for it.
2. Unusually defensive as compared to other natural resources sectors like forestry. In the urban water supply and
sanitation sector there has been more institutional and organisational dynamics, particularly through privatisation
and public–private partnership approaches.
3. The resonance with Scott’s (1998) perspective on large (infrastructural) projects as instruments of establishing state
rule is obvious, but not pursued in this article.
4. Prior to the introduction of high yielding varieties, rice was already an irrigated crop. However, from a ‘productive
discourse’ perspective existing levels of hydraulic water control were lower than required for ‘green revolution’
agriculture (Ishikawa, 1967).
5. ‘Poor performance’ was expressed as ineﬀective irrigation water use resulting in low irrigation eﬃciency (see Bottrall,
1981; O’Mara, 1990).
6. Apart from the World Bank, Indonesia’s donors in irrigation development in the 1980s have included the Asian
Development Bank and the governments of the Netherlands, Japan, Australia, and the United States. Though diverse
in their approach and mode of operation, these donors share common characteristics in the way they based their
development agenda on the international policy trend of a shift from construction towards O&M to catch up with
‘deferred maintenance’.
7. Though WUAs were formed at tertiary level, farmers had always been responsible for irrigation management at this
level prior to IMT. The tertiary level represents the network of irrigation canals directly connected to farmers’ ﬁelds.
In larger scale irrigation it is the local irrigation unit that receives water from the upstream primary and secondary
levels, the conveyance system conventionally managed by the irrigation agency. The secondary level represents part of
the conveyance system initially managed by the irrigation agency.
8. The principles of management transfer as stated in the Letter of Sector Policy of 1999 were rendered highly
ambiguous by the subsequent Water Law of 2004.
9. Consensus existed among the policy elites on the problem deﬁnition – a consensus possible through exclusion of
irrigators and line staﬀ (cf. McRae, 1993).
10. See Araral (2005) on the vicious cycle problem of public irrigation in the Philippines.
11. See the ﬁve core elements of dominant narratives (agent, act, scene, agency, and purpose) in Kaplan (1993).
12. And neither were the sometimes idealised understandings of FMIS questioned in policy discourse (cf. Mosse, 2003).
13. See Mollinga (2003) for how, in the Indian case, under the Command Area Development (CAD) programme, the
irrigation agency actively kept WUA formation and activity at the level ‘below the outlet’, not allowing it to aﬀect
‘above the outlet’ governance and management, being its own domain. In Indonesia institutional reform initiatives
for ‘proper’ operation of the main system was initiated under Irrigation Sub Sector Project I, but with little
sustainable impact.
14. This belief originated at least discursively from the experience with the Gal Oya irrigation project in Sri Lanka, where
the combination of physical rehabilitation and farmers’ involvement resulted in the successful establishment of a
farmer organisation and a signiﬁcant increase in water productivity (Uphoﬀ, 1986). However, later ﬁndings show that
the positive lessons from Gal Oya have not been repeated even within the country (Aluwihare and Kikuchi, 1991).
15. The terminology ‘irrigation management transfer’ is itself evasive, if not misleading. What is actually implied in strong
formulations of IMT is governance transfer, that is, transfer of the power to allocate water and funds. While irrigation
agencies may be willing, even happy, to transfer management tasks, they are generally highly reluctant to transfer
governance power (see Mollinga and Bolding, 2004).
16. Deferred maintenance is a symptom, we suggest, of institutionalised corruption within the irrigation agency, and
corruption a signiﬁcant part of the X factor in X!DMþPP. The ‘system of political and administrative corruption’
(cf. Wade, 1982 for India) that operates in the Indonesian irrigation bureaucracy will be discussed in detail in a
separate article (Suhardiman and Mollinga, in preparation; see also Repetto’s analysis (1986) on rent-seeking in
irrigation). The key element for the present analysis is that the ﬂow of international irrigation funds signiﬁcantly
supports the so called upeti system, which constitutes a strong logic for continuation of donor projects quite unrelated
to irrigation management as such. As an integral part of upeti system donor funds become an important ﬁnancial
means for the national elite to gain and sustain political power (MacIntyre, 1994). We argue that this political value
of donor funds necessitates the irrigation agency to shape its development orientation as to ﬁt into donors’ investment
























strategy and comply with the dominant narratives. See also Anderson (1991) on the continuity between the colonial
bureaucracy and the present day bureaucratic mechanisms and procedures.
17. Rationales for reform vary with actors’ and agencies’ perceptions. Many irrigation oﬃcials may have believed that
performance improvement was important, but for the Ministry of Finance, the budget savings that IMT promised
were clearly an important part of the reform rationale. Similarly, diﬀerent actors within one agency could position
themselves diﬀerently as regards to certain policy problems (see Suhardiman, 2008 for detailed discussion).
18. In addition, this stratagem allows the reproduction of a self-perception of donors’ developmental role as being
paramount, or, in reverse, the reproduction of a relationship with national government oﬃcials that is one of
dependence with mutual beneﬁts (cf. Mosse, 2004).
19. In both cases the analytical black box is ‘incentives’. In addition, there may be additional structural determinants.
20. The way this service provision based relation between farmers and the irrigation agency resulted in increased yields
highlights the paradoxical notion of poor systems performance/deferred maintenance arguments in donors’ dominant
narratives. In Indonesia, ‘poorly performing’ systems produce average yields of 3–4 ton/hectare with 2–3 rice crops/
year, while Indonesia became a rice exporting country in the Suharto period. Whether achieved yields and other
system parameters constitute poor performance depends on the standards adopted, what is incorporated in these, and
how they are expressed. A discussion of the ‘politics of standards’ that could be imagined in this connection, and
which would involve mobilising critical debates on indicators and cost/beneﬁt calculations, is outside the scope of this
article. We are of the opinion that there is a performance issue in Indonesian irrigation, otherwise we would not have
written the article, but the argument of the article also suggests that actual levels of performance are perhaps not the
key factor in poor performance policy discourse.
21. These doctrines include, in Indonesia, the pasten or k-factor system as well as operation guideline for speciﬁc
irrigation infrastructure such as the Romijn gates.
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